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SECURITIES LAW
COOPERATIVE SHARES DEEMED SUBJECT TO SECURITIES ACTS
Forman v. Community Services, Inc.
1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson
One of the most persistent problems courts have faced in the
interpretation of the 1933 Securities Act1 and the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act2 is the determination of whether an investment offering is
a security or a real property interest not included within the coverage
of the statutes.3 The problem is often more difficult to resolve than
first appearances would indicate. In the words of Professor Loss, "Some
things which look like real estate are securities, some things which look
like securities are real property."4
1 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
3 The question arose early in the history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in connection
with agricultural developments. See SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (D. Fla. 1941) (sale of
land, planted with oil producing trees, with a simultaneous offering of development con-
tracts ruled a security); SEC v. Tung Corp. of America, 32 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ill. 1940)
(sale of land, planted with a commercially valuable tree, combined with a lease-back and
development contract ruled a security). These decisions culminated in the landmark
opinion of the Supreme Court in SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, rehearing denied,
329 U.S. 819 (1946) (sale of citrus groves with a contract for care and development ruled
a security). Similar "citrus cases" have continued to reappear over the years. See Black-
well v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); SEC v.
Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 1962) (both cases finding a security where
groves were sold along with development contracts).
Such holdings have not, however, been limited to the agricultural field. See SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sale of oil lease assignments along with
exploration contracts ruled a security); Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961) (sale of oil leases with representation that test wells
would be drilled by promoters ruled a security); Mansfield v. United States, 155 F.2d 952
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 792 (1946) (sale of land under false promise to drill oil
wells ruled a security); Atherton v. United States, 128 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1942) (sale of
fractional assignments of oil and gas leases with representation that test wells would be
drilled ruled a security).
Cases involving the sale of personal property present a similar problem. See Con-
tinental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905
(1968) (sale of live beavers with contracts for their care and sale ruled a security); Pen-
field Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944) (exchange of bottling contracts for whiskey
warehouse receipts along with agreement to sell bottled whiskey and pay a portion of
the proceeds to the contract holders ruled a security); SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47
F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (purchase of whiskey with agreement to pay seller proceeds
of eventual sale of whiskey less expenses ruled a security); SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873
(S.D.N.Y. 1940) (sale of live silver foxes along with care and marketing agreement ruled
a security). See generally 1 L. Loss, SFcuRImE REGULATIONs 489-94 (2d ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as Loss] and Selvers, Investment Contracts: Expanding Effective Securities
Regulation, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 525 (1974).
4 Loss, supra note 3, at 493.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In two closely connected cases, Forman v. Community Services,
Inc.5 and 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson,6 the Second Circuit was
presented with the question whether shares in a cooperative housing
development are securities within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934
Acts.7 Both cases involved allegations by cooperative unit purchasers
that the developers had violated the antifraud provisions of the two
Acts." The defendants in 1050 Tenants were private promoters9 while
in Forman, the defendant promoters included a state government
housing finance agency.10 In each case, the Second Circuit declared
that cooperative stock, whether issued in conjunction with a private
development or a publicly financed nonprofit project, is a security
within the meaning of the two Securities Acts." Thus, the offerors
could be subject to liability under the applicable antifraud provisions.
5 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 43 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1975) (No. 74-157). The panel consisted of
Judges Hays and Oakes, joined by Judge Christensen of the District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
B503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974). The panel consisted of Judges Timbers and Smith,
joined by Judge Tyler of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
7 The statutory definition of the term "security" in the Securities Act was designed
to be "in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the
many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the concept of a
security." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933). Section 2(1) of the Act states,
in pertinent part:
[Tihe term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit shar-
ing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1971). For a closely parallel definition, see Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1971). The two definitions have been treated as identical by the courts.
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
Whether the cooperative stock in both Forman and 1050 Tenants falls within the
definition of a security is, in the first instance, a jurisdictional question. The lower court
in Forman, finding no security to be present, denied federal jurisdiction. Forman v.
Community Services, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In 1050 Tenants, the
district court upheld federal jurisdiction on the basis of its finding that the offering was
a security. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
8The Forman complaint alleged violations of both the Securities Act § 17(a), 15
U.S.C. § 779(a) (1970), and the Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule
lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). 500 F.2d at 1248.
The 1050 Tenants complaint similarly alleged violations of these general antifraud
provisions of both Acts, as well as a violation of Securties Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1970), which specifically prohibits the use of false or misleading statements in an oral
communication or a prospectus concerning the purchase or sale of a security.
9 503 F.2d at 1377.
10 Co-op City, the cooperative development with which the Forman case is con-
cerned, was initiated by the United Housing Foundation (UHF), a New York nonprofit
corporation, under New York's Mitchell-Lama Act, N.Y. PRIVATE HousING FIN. L. §§ 10-37
(McKinney 1962). The purpose of the Mitchell-Lama Act and the UHF is to foster "the
growth of nonprofit cooperative housing for low and low-middle income families." 500
F.2d at 1249.
11500 F.2d at 1250; 503 F.2d at 1378.
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In reaching its decision,'12 the court employed two alternate tests
for finding the cooperative offering to be a security within the meaning
of the Acts. Based on a "literal" test, the offering was found to be
within the statutory ambit solely because the thing offered, coopera-
tive stock, is denominated in a manner commonly understood to de-
scribe a security.13 Alternatively, the court ruled that the offering ful-
filled the substantive requirements necessary to a finding that a security
is present.14
Since the inception of investor protection legislation as embodied
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, courts have consistently given an expan-
sive interpretation to the definition of a security as enunciated by those
Acts.1 As a result, investor protection has been extended to include
not only the commonly recognized forms of securities but also any
"[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to
be,"' 6 whenever they are, in effect, securities. 17 Thus, courts have often
been faced with the task of bringing such "novel" schemes within the
coverage of the Acts.' For this reason, it has been the position of
the courts that substance will prevail over form in bringing a ques-
tionable offering within the statutory definition.19 The Supreme Court
expressed the general rule by noting that "in searching for the mean-
ing and scope of the word 'security' . . . , form should be disregarded
for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality."20
Accordingly, mere appearances will not suffice to exclude an offering
from the coverage of the Acts so long as the factual elements of a
security are present.2 1
These substantive elements were set forth by the Supreme Court
in the landmark decision of SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.22 There, the
12 Since the holding of the court in 1050 Tenants relies directly on the reasoning
of the Forman decision, the two opinions may be discussed concurrently.
13 500 F.2d at 1252-53; 503 F.2d at 1378.
'4500 F.2d at 1253-55; 503 F.2d at 1378.
'5 See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 US. 332, 338 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943). See
generally Loss, supra note 3, at ch. 3A; cases cited in note 3 supra.
16 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
17 Id. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
18 Some recent examples include SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F2d
476 (9th Cir. 1973) (pyramid investment plan); SEC v. MA. Lundy Associates, 362 F. Supp.
226 (D.I. 1973) (whiskey warehouse receipts); SEC v. American Foundation for Ad-
vanced Educ., 222 F. Supp. 828 (WD. La. 1963) (college education finance plan). See also
cases cited in note 3 supra.
19 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 US. 293, 298 (1946). See SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of
America, 93 F.2d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1937). See also Loss, supra note 3, at 488.
20 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967), citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
21 See Loss, supra note 3, at 488.
22328 US. 293, rehearing denied, 329 US. 819 (1946).
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Court established the definition of an "investment contract," and, there-
fore, a security, as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. ' 23 With minor
modifications,24 the Howey test has remained the controlling defini-
tion of a security.25 It has been applied to a wide range of investment
contracts despite the facial characterization of the offering as some-
thing which would not ordinarily be deemed a security.26
It appears logical to conclude that the Howey test would apply
equally well to exclude an offering from coverage of the Acts when
the offering fails to meet the substantive requirements of a security.
In fact, such has been the prevailing view of the courts.27 However,
in Forman, the Second Circuit set forth the view that the substantive
test is solely inclusory in nature.28 In other words, while substance will
prevail over form to render an offering includable, an offering which
has the facial appearance of a security will also be included even
though, in substance, it would not otherwise qualify.
The Forman court, relying on the Supreme Court's literal test in
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,20 held that "if a given instrument
23 328 U.S. at 298-99.
2 4 Some of the more important modifications include relaxation of the requirement
that there be exclusive third party management and that profits be solely monetary. See
Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 375 (10th Cir. 1973) ("in name only" management role of
investor not sufficient to avoid a finding of third-party management within the Howey
test); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (requirement that in-
vestor perform nominal or limited managerial duties not sufficient to evade the third-
party management test); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir. 1973) (element of third-party management is present where the undeniably significant
managerial efforts are made by the third-party manager); Davenport v. United States,
260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959) (job security a sufficient
"profit'); SEC v. American Foundation for Advanced Educ., 222 F. Supp. 828, 831 (W.D.
La. 1963) (assurance that investor's children will have financial capability to attend col-
lege a sufficient "profit").
25 See generally Loss, supra note 8, at ch. 3A.
28 See, e.g., cases cited notes 3 & 18 supra.
27 Courts have generally excluded questionable offerings where any one of the
Howey elements is lacking. See, e.g., Lynn v. Caraway, 379 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1967) (ele-
ment of dependence on efforts of third party lacking); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d
108 (10th Cir. 1959) (third-party management lacking); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp.,
153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957) (element of common enterprise lacking). The Forman
court recognized that the weight of authority still lies with this view, stating that "there
is still substantial authority for the proposition that substance should govern rather than
form even to restrict coverage of the Acts." 500 F.2d at 1253.
28 See 500 F.2d at 1252-53. The Forman court adopted the literal test for purposes
of inclusion of the cooperative stock but, nevertheless, noted that form alone could not
be used to exclude an instrument.
For a discussion of the dangers of the literal view, see Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 782, 786-87 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is
There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CAsE W. Rrs. L. Rv. 367, 446-07 (1967).
29320 U.S. 344 (1943). The Joiner Court instructed that "[i]nstruments may be in-
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is a share of stock 'on its face' it is literally within the ambit of the
statute."30 Thus, exclusion from the coverage of the Acts could not
be argued where the offering is of an instrument which is labelled
"stock."31 This would appear to be the case even where the substan-
tive factors involved would lead an issuer to believe that the instru-
ment could not be deemed a security under the Howey test.
The Second Circuit grounded the rationale for the literal test on
the proposition that the purchaser of what on its face appears to be
stock may be led to believe that he is entitled to protection under
the Acts.82 Although the theory of the court may have some general
applicability, 3 it is difficult to accept uncritically the conclusion that
the layman cooperative unit buyer looks upon his transaction with the
developer as something more than the "purchase" of an apartment.
Nevertheless, the underlying purpose of the court in adopting this
line of reasoning is not without merit. There is little doubt that,
regardless of any imputed reliance, the cooperative unit purchaser is
in urgent need of the protection afforded by the Acts.34
cluded within any of [the Acts] definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face they an-
swer to the name or description." Id. at 851.
30500 F.2d at 1252. In 1050 Tenants, the court grounded its decision upon the literal
test propounded in Forman. 503 F.2d at 1378.
31 The literal view is not without precedential support. See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey
Photo Inc., 221 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (the 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) inclusion of "any note" within the definition of a security was alone
sufficient to find the installment promissory notes in question to be securities). State
courts have also, on occasion, taken the literal approach. See, e.g., Strauss v. State, 13
Ga. App. 90, 147 S.E.2d 367 (Ct. App. 1966) (money orders held to be securities simply
because they were "evidences of indebtedness" under state security laws).
32 The Forman court observed:
[Wihere one utilizes the outward and traditional manifestations of a "stock" or-
ganization, the buyer may be led to believe that what he is buying is "stock"
as normally considered and which would be protected by the federal or state se-
curities laws. Indeed, the buyer of the purported "stock" may rely to some extent
on the notion that he will at least be protected by those laws.
500 F.2d at 1252.
33 The theory of the court would certainly apply in the case of forged securities
where the investor's reliance on the protection of the Acts is a relevant consideration.
Forged securities have been included within the coverage of the Acts. See Seeman v.
United States, 90 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir. 1937), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, sub-
sequent conviction on the same indictment aff'd, 96 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 620 (1938); Loss, supra note 3, at 511-12.
34 Cooperative offerings have long been marred by significant abuses on the part of
promoters. These activities have included: exorbitant profit taking; pre-subscription
self-dealing; coercion of tenants during conversions; and, perhaps most important to the
purchaser, gross underestimation of carrying charges. Underestimation of carrying charges,
in particular, provided the basis for the plaintiffs' complaint in Forman. 500 F.2d at
1250. See P. ROHAN 8- M. REsKIN, COOrERATrvE LAW AND PRACTCE § 3A.02[l] (1974) [here-
inafter cited as RoHAN &: REsIN]; Note, Cooperative Housing Corporations and the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 71 CoLum. L. REV. 118, 118-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cooperative
Housing Corporations].
The fact that little actual protection has been provided to the cooperative purchaser
1975]
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After utilizing the literal test to deem the cooperative stock a
"security," both the Forman and 1050 Tenants opinions held alter-
natively that even under the substantive test of Howey, the result
would be the same.35 The Howey elements of transaction, investment,
common enterprise, and third-party management were all clearly pres-
ent in the cooperative offerings.8 6 Consequently, the Forman and 1050
Tenants courts focused their attention on the more difficult issue of
whether there existed an "expectation of profit" sufficient to warrant
the inclusion of the stock within the coverage of the Acts.
The determination that profit expectation is indeed present in
a cooperative offering was made with relative ease in 1050 Tenants.87
Most obviously, the cooperative purchaser, like any other home buyer,
looks to an appreciation in the value of his dwelling.3 8 Since legal
realities dictate that the cooperative stock held by the owner is unal-
terably tied to the unit, the appreciation is, in legal terms, realized
as a result of selling the stock which entitles the purchaser to occu-
pancy of the unit.3 9 While the cooperative unit owner may look upon
the appreciation as deriving from a sale of "the unit," it actually results
from the sale of the stock. The expectation of profit can therefore be
said to attend the purchase of cooperative stock, thereby fulfilling the
Howey formula.40 Furthermore, the 1050 Tenants court discerned three
additional areas of profit:
(1) the shareholder-tenants ... benefit directly from substantial
non-residential income [resulting from rental proceeds of pro-
by state law has led to suggestions that effective safeguards could be assured if coop-
erative stock were made subject to the Securities Acts. The commentators advocating this
approach have noted that any difficulty with the Howey test could be obviated by adop-
tion of a literal test. See ROHAN & RasaN, supra, at § 3A.02[2]; Cooperative Housing
Corporations, supra at 122. The Forman and 1050 Tenants opinions implidtly adopt this
reasoning.
35 500 F.2d at 1253; 503 F.2d at 1378.
36 5o0 F.2d at 1253-54; 503 F.2d at 1378.
87 503 F.2d at 1378.
38 Id.
39 See RoAN & REsiN., supra note 34, at § 2.01[5].
40 In the alternative, it is possible to look upon the offering as one of real property
in conjunction with a contract or agreement for management and development. Since
some confusion has arisen as to the status of cooperative ownership as either real or per-
sonal property, see RoHAN & PRasaN, supra note 34, at § 1.03, this alternative view war-
rants consideration. A number of state courts have taken the view that the cooperator's
interest is in real property. See, e.g., Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So. 2d 610 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1962) (the cooperative is real estate and the issue of stock is meaningless to the
determination); Lacaille v. Feldman, 44 Misc. 2d 370, 353 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1964) (cooperator's interest is in the nature of a quasi-real property interest).
Nevertheless, even if considered a real property interest, the classification as a security
would still appear appropriate. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
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fessional apartments] which is used by the corporation to re-
duce the monthly carrying charges;
(2) they are afforded an opportunity to make substantial savings
on their personal income tax in the form of deductions for
their payment of a proportional share of the corporation's de-
ductible expenses [including mortgage interest expense];
(3) they stand to benefit from obtaining optimum services at the
lowest possible cost.
41
Needless to say, these areas of cost saving have always been significant
inducements to cooperative unit purchasers. 42 Additionally, they rep-
resent some of the more important practical financial advantages of
cooperative ownership over apartment rental. 43
The Forman court found it necessary to rely solely on these three
cost-saving factors to serve as the element of profit.4 Since the project
in which the Forman purchasers acquired their stock is a publicly
supervised project under New York's Mitchell-Lama Act,4 5 cooperators
are not permitted to profit by the sale of their stock.46 The possibility
of appreciation in the value of the stock is, therefore, not present.
Nevertheless, the potential enjoyment of profit through appreciation
was not, in the court's view, necessary for a finding that the Howey
requirements were fulfilled. Moreover, recognizing that the project in
Forman was publicly financed and that the promoter, the United
Housing Foundation, is a nonprofit entity under state supervision, the
court observed that "the fact that there may be no profit motive on
the part of the promoter ... does not by any means affect the profit
motives on the part of the subscribers." 47 On the contrary, the court
ruled that application of nonresidential income of the project to reduce
carrying costs, the deductibility to the unit lessee of mortgage interest
expenses paid by the corporation, and the probability that cooperators
will obtain optimum services at the lowest possible cost were, in them-
selves, sufficient "profit" for purposes of the substantive test.48
41503 F-2d at 1378.
42 See 4A R. Pow.LL, REAL PRoPERTY 632 (rev. ed. 1974).
43 Id.
44500 F-2d at 1254, citing 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 365 F. Supp. 1171, 1176
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
45 N.Y. PRiVATE HOUSING FIN. L §§ 10-37 (McKinney 1962). See note 10 supra.
461d. § 31a.
47500 F.2d at 1255.
48 The "substantial" nonresidential income that the tenant-shareholders relied on
consisted of approximately $1.1 million in rents paid by retail stores, $667,000 in office
space rental and coin-operated washing machine revenues, and $2.5 million in annual
parking fees collected from tenants and others. 500 F.2d at 1254. The court noted that
this income would not be sent to tenants in the form of a dividend check, but would
nevertheless, inure to their benefit since it was used to reduce carrying charges. Although
19751
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The immediate effect of the 1050 Tenants and Forman decisions
is to bring all cooperative stock within the ambit of the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. 49 Undoubtedly, the
implications for the cooperative promoter are enormous. For example,
a primary concern will be the potential for liability under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act5° and its complement, rule 1Ob-5,r' which
together outlaw the use of any manipulative or deceptive device "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security."52 The plaintiff
is provided with significant advantages in prosecuting a lOb-5 fraud
action, particularly relaxation of the reliance, causation, and scienter
requirements of fraud.53
Moreover, it seems that the wide breadth of the two decisions
will reach beyond the cooperative field. The reasoning of the Second
Circuit in including cooperative stock within the coverage of federal
securities laws appears to have at least some application to promoters
of non-cooperative forms of co-homeownership. A particularly apropos
example is the sponsor of a condominium project in which the com-
mon elements are incorporated. 54 Considering the literal test applied
by the Second Circuit to cooperative shares, a condominium offering
plan containing a provision for incorporation of common elements
might be viewed as the offering of a security. Certainly, the shares
representing ownership of common elements would be tied to each
not a direct monetary benefit, it was "profit" under the Howey concept. Id. This reason-
ing is in line with prior determinations that profit need not be in the form of a direct
monetary return. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
49 Specifically, it is conceivable that an action could be brought under both the Se-
curities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970) (prohibiting use of any means of interstate
commerce to employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud by false or misleading state-
ments in the offer of sale of a security), and the Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970) (prohibiting use of any means of interstate commerce to employ any manipulative
or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of any security). Should the
sale of the cooperative stock also involve a false or misleading oral communication or
prospectus, an additional cause of action might be brought under the Securities Act
§ 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
G0 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
51 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to the authority granted in section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
53 See generally Note, SEC Rule lOb-5: A Recent Profile, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv.
860 (1972).
54 Incorporation of the condominium's common elements, e.g., hallways, sidewalks,
and recreational centers, has been proposed as a means of insulating individual unit
owners from tort liability for acts of negligence in connection with the common areas.
P. ROHAN & M. REsKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PaAcrIcE § IOA.03[l] (1974); see Knight,
Incorporation of Condominium Common Areas? Aft Alternative, 50 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1971);
Comment, The Condominium and the Corporation-A Proposal for Texas, 11 HousroN
L. Ray. 454 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Texas Proposal].
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unit and thereby be inextricably a part of the offering. 5 As such, the
purchase of a unit would include the purchase of shares which literally
qualify as securities.5 6 With this realization in mind, the prudent con-
dominium developer would steer clear of common element incorpora-
tion, lest he inadvertently expose himself to securities fraud liability
under the federal law.
Additional questions arise from the substantive test used by the
Second Circuit. The Howey criteria, read concurrently with the For-
man and 1050 Tenants definition of profits, would seem to find appli-
cation in the condominium as well as the cooperative field. A condo-
minium unit purchaser most certainly invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits both in the form of appreciation
upon resale and cost savings arising from nonresidential income, de-
duction of real estate taxes, and the acquisition of maximum services
at minimum cost. Likewise, in all condominiums, a major portion of
the value of the unit as well as the maximization of cost saving is
likely to depend on the efforts of a third party, i.e., the board of man-
agers, much the same as it does in a cooperative. The voting rights
of the unit owner and his ability to participate in management are
not likely to defeat the essential third-party nature of the board any
more than the voting and participation rights of the cooperator defeat
the third-party nature of the cooperative corporation. 57
In many respects, it is difficult to make substantive distinctions
between the condominium and cooperative purchaser. 8 Although it
is generally held that the cooperator's property interest is personal59
while that of the condominium unit owner is most certainly real prop-
erty,60 if substance is truly allowed to govern form, the distinction is
tenuous at best. Moreover, one need only look to the Howey decision
55 See Texas Proposal, supra note 54, at 464.
ti The Texas Proposal author argues for exemption of the condominium stock on
the ground that the corporation would be nonprofit in nature. Id. at 463. However, if
the Forman logic is applied, the nonprofit character of the corporation is irrelevant. See
500 F.2d at 1255.
57 The Howey phrase, "solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party," 328
U.S. at 299 (emphasis added), is no longer taken literally. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
58 It has been noted that condominium and cooperative purchasers encounter many
of the same consumer problems. See Note, Florida Condominiums -Developer Abuses
and Securities Law Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA.
L. Rnv. 350 (1973). These difficulties are almost identical to those which affected the
court's determination in Forman and 1050 Tenants. See note 34 supra.
59 See RoAN & RnsiN, supra note 34, at § 1.03.
60 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 825, §§ 47-73, 47-74(a) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 711.04(1), (3) (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8A-4, 46:8A-6 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAIW §§ 339-e(15), 339-g, 339-h (McKinney 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 700.201
(1965). See generally P. ROHAN & M. RnsKiN, CONDOmINium LAW AND PRAcnCE § 1.01[2]
(1974).
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to rebut a contention that the real property interest involved in a
condominium is alone sufficient to disallow coverage under the Acts. 61
Furthermore, the Joiner Court, 2 in considering an offering of what
appeared to be real estate, pointed out that "courts have not been
guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or
offering."63
If the Forman court's rationale is adopted by the Supreme Court,
or if other circuits accept its expansive definition of real estate secur-
ities, it is probable that both cooperative and condominium promoters
may find themselves defending a new torrent of federal securities fraud
claims. Confusing the situation, however, is a statement by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission that most condominium offerings,
typically sales of primary residences without rental pools, would not
be deemed securities, at least for registration purposes:
In situations where commercial facilities are a part of the common
elements of a residential project, no registration would be re-
quired under the investment contract theory where (a) the income
from such facilities is used only to offset common area expenses,
and (b) the operation of such facilities is incidental to the project
as a whole and are not established as a primary income source
for the individual owners of a condominium or cooperative unit.64
Since the Second Circuit's analysis of investment contracts appears
inconsistent with this position, it is understandable that the real estate
bar is anxious for more concrete guidelines on the applicability of
federal securities laws to the housing market.65
Thomas J. Hakala
61The Howey case, discussed in the text accompanying notes 22-26 supra, involved
the sale of citrus groves along with a contract for service. Despite the fact that the offer-
ing included a sale of real property, the Court had no difficulty in finding a security. 328
U.S. at 299-300.
02 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), discussed in text accom-
panying note 29 supra.
03 Id. at 352.
64 Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973). The release principally concerned
the use of rental pool arrangements in resort condominium offerings, which would trigger
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. A rental pool is defined as
a device whereby the promoter or a third party undertakes to rent the unit on
behalf of the actual owner during that period of time when the unit is not in
use by the owner .... [T]he individual owner receives a ratable share of the
rental proceeds regardless of whether his individual unit was actually rented.
Id.
65 See, e.g., Weiss, Real Estate or a Security, 172 N.Y.L.J. 96, Nov. 18, 1974, at I,
col. 1.
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